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NOTES AND COMMUNICATIONS
HOME AND MORTGAGE OWNERSHIP OF THE DUTCH ELDERLY: EXPLAINING
COHORT, TIME AND AGE EFFECTS∗∗∗∗
Summary
The relationship between home ownership of Dutch elderly households and age is strongly neg-
ative. Other studies suggest that this age gradient should be attributed to a cohort effect. In this
paper, we investigate where those cohort effects come from. We also observe that mortgage own-
ership among elderly home owners increased considerably during the nineties. Using panel data,
we estimate models explaining home and mortgage ownership by age, cohort, and time effects, as
well as other factors. Cohort and time effects are modelled explicitly using macro economic and
housing market related variables. We ﬁnd that the level of GDP per capita when the household
head was young is the main factor explaining generation effects in home ownership among the
elderly. After accounting for cohort effects it also appears that home ownership decreases slightly
with age. Mortgage ownership among elderly home owners rose considerably during the nine-
ties due to house price increases and due to ﬁnancial innovation in the mortgage market. Cohort
effects are also important. A supplementary analysis suggests that those cohort effects are due to
the fact that the accidental bequest motive is becoming less important.
Key words: cohort effects, home ownership, mortgages
JEL Code(s) D12, D14, D91
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper examines, among other things, the degree to which Dutch elderly
households reduce their home ownership. There is considerable interest in the
wealth holdings of the elderly, for several reasons. First of all, due to popula-
tion ageing, the elderly’s wealth position is of particular interest from a policy
perspective. If the elderly have not saved enough to sustain themselves in old
age, this may have dramatic consequences for the society as a whole. A second
reason to be interested in the home ownership of the elderly is that it provides
a prima facie test of the life cycle hypothesis. This paper can be seen as a fol-
low-up study to Alessie et al. (1995) who have used panel data covering the
period 1987–1991. Roughly speaking, they have found that the median Dutch
elderly household did not own a home at the beginning of the 1990s. Conse-
quently, the asset holdings of the median household were so small that they
∗∗∗∗We thank Maarten van Rooij, Konstantinos Tatsiramos, Casper van Ewijk, Wouter Vermeu-
len, Frederic Vermeulen, Frank de Jong and Marcel Lever for their useful comments
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could ﬁnance consumption for a few months: they only served as a buffer for
adverse shocks. Consumption of the median retired household was ﬁnanced
through social security and occupational pension income.
The picture sketched by Alessie et al. (1995) has changed dramatically
during the nineties. Home ownership rates among elderly households in the
Netherlands rose by more than 10% points during that period. Nevertheless,
the home ownership rate is still considerably lower than in other Euro-
pean countries and the US. Moreover, the relationship between home own-
ership and age is rather peculiar in the Netherlands: in 1990 about 54%
of all households at age 55 and 30% around age 75 owns a house. Such
a strong age gradient is not observed in other developed countries. In the
United Kingdom, the US and Italy the average percentage of households
with an own house is, respectively, 75%, 78% and 70% between age 50
and 59. This is still 57%, 75% and 66% between age 70 and 79 (Chi-
uri and Jappelli (2000)). Analysis on panel data by Alessie and Kapteyn
(2002) shows that the strong negative cross-sectional relationship between
home ownership and age among elderly Dutch households should be pre-
sumably attributed to a cohort effect. This ﬁnding suggests that on aver-
age the generations born after World War II (will) enter the retirement
phase with much more wealth than the generations born before 19301. If
the younger generations retire, private wealth will not only serve as a buffer
for adverse shocks but can also be used for consumption purposes or for
(intentional) bequests. For policy analysis it is interesting to know where
those strong cohort effects in home ownership come from and whether or
not generations born after, say, 1960 will be predominantly home owners
when they enter retirement. In this paper, we try to answer this type of
questions. Using a panel data set covering the period 1990–2002, we explain
those cohort effects on basis of macro economic and housing market related
variables. One important cohort effect might stem from the fact that due to
productivity growth younger generations have a higher lifetime income (per-
manent income) than the older ones. Like Kapteyn et al. (2005), we try to
capture this productivity growth effect by means of real GDP per capita level
when the household head was young (between age 23 and 27).
We also consider housing market conditions around age 25 as measured by
the supply of the new houses in the rental and owner occupied sector, respec-
tively. Due to the highly regulated housing market policies in the Netherlands,
housing market conditions at young ages might have had a long-term effect
on the home ownership status at a later stage of the life cycle2. Just after
World War II there was a large housing shortage. Therefore, the government
1 This older generation has been investigated by Alessie et al. (1995).
2 In order to investigate this long-term effect in more detail, we also estimate the home own-
ership equation on a subsample consisting of households with a head who is at least 50 years
old.
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planned to build many subsidised dwellings in a short period. Until 1975, the
annual number of newly built rented dwellings was larger than the production
of owner-occupied houses. Consequently, many households born in the 1920s,
1930s (and 1940s) ended up in a rental dwelling when they were young. Rents
of subsidised dwellings were and are still low due to the highly regulated poli-
cies by the central and local governments. Given these low rents, it might have
been attractive for the older generations not to move to an owner occupied
house at an older age, even in the case that household income has increased
considerably. According to criteria set by the government approximately a
quarter of all tenants should, regarding their income, not occupy a council
house (this number refers to 1989, see Ministry of Housing (1999)). From the
1990s onwards, government policy is geared towards stimulating home owner-
ship. Consequently, in the nineties the number of newly built owner-occupied
dwellings is considerably larger than the number of new houses in the rental
sector.
We are also interested in the question whether retired households use their
housing wealth to ﬁnance consumption as predicted by the life cycle model
(see Deaton (1992), Hurd (1989) for an overview of the life cycle model). One
of the ways to cash housing wealth for consumption purposes is to sell the
house and to rent afterwards. Therefore it is interesting to investigate the rela-
tionship between home ownership and age after having corrected for cohort
effects.
Instead of becoming a renter, elderly home owners could ﬁnance consump-
tion by taking up a mortgage. In this paper, we show that during the nineties
mortgage ownership among elderly home owners increased even more dra-
matically than home ownership. Moreover, it appears that mortgage redemp-
tion between the age of 60 and 70 is less popular than one might expect.
The increase in mortgage ownership among elderly home owners are not only
due to cohort effects. Macroeconomic and institutional changes which took
place during our sample period (1990–2002) could also have played a role.
The 1990s (and especially the second half of the 1990s) witnessed a high-
economic growth, low-real interest rates and large increases in house prices.
Moreover, new mortgage types were introduced which exploit as much as pos-
sible the tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments3.
In our analysis of the home ownership and mortgage decision we should
take into account that in 1993 banks relaxed the mortgage qualiﬁcation con-
straint for two earner couples. Before that year, banks typically considered
only the income of the husband in determining the maximum allowable mort-
3 Up to 1999, all mortgage interest payments were tax deductible. In 2000, the tax author-
ities curtailed the deductibility a bit. Interest payments are not anymore tax deductibility if
the mortgage is used to ﬁnance stock market operations or durable goods (such as a car or
sailing boat). In 2002, the tax authorities curtailed the tax deductibility of mortgage interest
payments somewhat further.
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gage loan. From 1993 onwards, banks also take the earnings of the wife
into account (Van Assenbergh (1998)). Obviously, such (institutional) changes
might have affected households’ decisions concerning home and mortgage
ownership. Furthermore, we should account for the fact that large increases
in the housing wealth appear to stimulate the take up of second mortgages
among elderly (Rouwendal and Alessie (2002)), (Haffner (2005)). Groeneveld
and de Haas (1999) mention ’a reduction in the Calvinism’ in the investment
and ﬁnancing behaviour as a possible explanation for this phenomenon.
The study is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the data
and show that mortgage ownership among elderly home owners has increased
by about 10% between 1990 and 2002. In section 3, we present the reduced
form model that accounts for cohort, time and age effects as well as socio-
economic related variables. Section 4 shows the empirical results. In section 5,
we further explore the cohort effects related to the changes in mortgage own-
ership. We end with the conclusions in section 6.
2 DATA
For the analysis of home and mortgage ownership we mainly use data which
stems from the Dutch Social Economic Panel (SEP). The SEP is a longitu-
dinal survey which is administered by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) between
1984 and 2002. It consists of approximately 4,600 households per year. The
aim of the SEP is to provide a description of the most important elements of
individual and household welfare, and to monitor changes in these elements
over time. The SEP questionnaire includes detailed questions on income,
wealth (as of 1987), labour force participation, demographics etcetera. The
sample is representative of the Dutch population excluding those living in
special institutions such as nursing homes. We only use data from 1990 to
2002, because in 1990 CBS revised the income questions dramatically. For
further information on the data, see e.g. Alessie et al. (1997).
The SEP dataset does not contain enough information to explain the
observed cohort and time effects in mortgage ownership among the elderly
(see below). Therefore we also perform some additional analysis on data
sponsored by the Nederlandsche Bank (DNB). The DNB Household Sur-
vey (DHS) was formerly known as the CentER panel or VSB panel. Nyhus
(1996) describes this data set and its general quality. From 1993 onwards, the
DHS-data are collected by CentERdata on an annual basis. The DHS-data
covers about 2,000 households each year4. The survey contains interesting
questions on the housing situation of a household and its savings and bequest
motives. Unfortunately, compared with the SEP the attrition rate in this panel
4 The DHS-survey is an internet survey. In the DHS, higher income deciles are somewhat
over-represented. We correct for this by using sample weights.
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is rather high: on average, a household participates in the DHS for a period
of 3.7 years. The corresponding number in the SEP is 6.1 years.
We select a subsample of households of which the head is between 25
and 80 years old. We delete the 80+ observations in order to prevent possi-
ble problems due to differential mortality. Since rich households tend to live
longer the relationship between age and home (mortgage) ownership may be
biased, especially in later life (Hurd (1990)).
2.1 Descriptive Analysis
In Figure 1, we present age and cohort patterns of the home ownership rate
based upon 13 waves of the SEP (1990–2002). We use 5-year-of-birth cohorts,
with birth years 1917–1921 for the oldest cohort until birth years 1962–1966
for the youngest cohort. Cohort labels indicate the middle year-of-birth of the
household head. The 13 points for each cohort represent the home owner-
ship rate at 13 age levels, and form a ‘cohort curve’. For each cohort, these
13 points are interconnected. Jumps between cohort curves show that, apart
from age effects, there are cohort or time effects5. The fact that cohort curves
are not horizontal shows that there are time and/or age effects; the fact that
not all cohort curves are the same shows that there is more than just time
effects. As usual, however, cohort, time and age effects cannot be disentangled
without further assumptions. In the discussion below and in the econometric
analysis (see section 4) we ignore time effects. This assumption implies that
home ownership is not affected by business cycle shocks during the sample
period6. Basically, we assume that business cycle shocks are unanticipated and
therefore independent of all explanatory variables. In other words, we assume
that the business cycle shocks are part of the error term in the model.
A ﬁrst glance at Figure 1 suggests that the age-home ownership proﬁle
has a hump shaped form: home ownership increases up to the age of 55 and
gradually declines with age afterwards. The vertical differences between the
curves indicate differences in home ownership between cohorts at the same
age. Those differences are sometimes large, indicating strong cohort effects in
5 Time effects are changes that occur during the sample period and that affect all households
in the sample in the same way each period.
6 In a sensitivity analysis, we have checked the validity of this assumption by adding time
speciﬁc variables such as growth in real GDP per capita, real interest rate and house prices
(in real terms). This does not affect dramatically our results on home ownership reported in
Section 4.1. For instance, the age coefﬁcients and the effect of the cohort variables on home
ownership do not change much by adding the time speciﬁc variables (see Van der Schors et al.
(2007) for more details on the sensitivity analysis). Moreover, it should be mentioned that the
econometric model takes the whole of transitory income into account. Transitory income could
partly capture business cycle effects. However, we do not include a full set of time dummies.
Also in other empirical studies on home ownership, for example (Chiuri and Jappelli (2006)),
time effects are not taken into account.
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Figure 1 – Home ownership by age and cohort.
Source: SEP, own computations
home ownership. For instance, from all households of which the head was
born between 1932 and 1936, approximately 52% owned a house at the age
of 56. This rate has increased to 63% for those born between 1937 and 1941
at the same age. So, there is a difference in home ownership of more than
10%-points between two adjacent cohorts.
Not surprisingly, the increase in home ownership is matched by a rise
in mortgage ownership. It is more interesting to analyse the probability of
having at least one mortgage outstanding on its current dwelling conditional
upon home ownership.
Figure 2 plots the cross-section relationship between mortgage ownership
rate among home owners and age in 1990 and in 2002. In this ﬁgure people
younger than forty are not considered: young home owners typically have an
mortgage outstanding. Figure 2 clearly shows that between 1990 and 2002 the
fraction of elderly home owners with a mortgage debt increased considerably:
in 2002, 72% of all home owners aged 65 still had a mortgage. In 1990 this
percentage was considerably lower, namely 45%. Such cohort-time effects are
hardly observed before the age of 50.
Similar to Figure 1, Figure 3 shows differences in mortgage ownership over
age and between different cohorts of home owners. Contrary to the econo-
metric analysis of home ownership, we argue that time effects should be taken
into account when explaining mortgage ownership. The introduction of new
mortgage types and the increased liberalisation of the mortgage market dur-
ing the sample period could have affected household’s mortgage behaviour.
However, the inclusion of time effects leads to an identiﬁcation problem, since
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Figure 2 – Mortgage ownership among home owners by age in 1990 and 2002.
Explanatory note: non-parametric regression technics (lowess smoothing) has
been used to estimate the relationship between age and mortgage ownership.
Source: SEP, own computations
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Figure 3 – Mortgage ownership among home owners by age and cohort.
Source: SEP, own computations
we can no longer disentangle cohort, age and time effects. Surprisingly, Figure
3 does not show clear evidence for an age-time effect. We do not see a clear
decline in mortgage ownership with age for all cohorts as common wisdom
would suggest.
From the descriptive analysis presented above we do not really explain the
cohort and time effects in home and mortgage ownership. In the next section,
we present a panel data model which can be used for this purpose.
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3 ECONOMETRIC MODEL
We analyse the home and mortgage ownership using a random effect linear
probability model. In order to relax the stringent assumptions of the random
effect model, we allow for correlation between unobserved household effects
and the explanatory variables by adding household speciﬁc averages of the
time varying regressors to the model (Mundlak (1978)). We also control for
possible sample selection biases -due to panel attrition- by including selectiv-
ity dummies. This leads to the following model, explaining home ownership
of household h belonging to cohort c in period t :
yh,t =αo +
I∑
i=1
δisi(ageh,t )
+
2001∑
τ=1990
στSDh,τ +Z′cλ+X′h,tβ +W ′hζ +ωh + εh,t , (1)
where the selectivity dummy SDh,τ takes on the value one if the household
participates in year τ and participates at least one more time in the survey
after period τ (τ =1990, . . . ,2001). Otherwise the dummy is equal to zero. If
the selectivity dummies are jointly signiﬁcant, there is an attrition bias prob-
lem. The age effect,
∑I
i=1 δisi(ageh,t ), is modelled by means of a linear spline
function with 10 knots at ages 30, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60, 65, 70, 75 and 80. The
δ-coefﬁcients reﬂect the marginal effect of becoming 1 year older for the ages
within each interval.
In our approach, we explicitly model the cohort effects by means of a
vector of cohort speciﬁc variables Zc. We assume that cohort effects are
driven by productivity differences and by the situation on the real estate
market at the time the household head entered the housing market, which
we take to be around age 257. As we already mentioned in the introduc-
tion, we have included three cohort variables in equation (1). The ﬁrst one
reﬂects the economic situation, using log (GDP per capita)8. The other two
variables are the logarithm of the amount of newly built houses in the owner-
occupied and rental sector respectively, expressed per head of the popula-
tion between the age of 20 and 30. We have to point out that the exact
number of newly built houses (by ownership type) is not available before
1960. We have imputed the unavailable data on the base of data con-
cerning new constructions and the number of new rented and owner-occu-
7 For each household the value belonging to each cohort variable is an average of the values
of the cohort variable in the years in which the head is 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27. We admit that
this choice is slightly arbitrary. Therefore we experimented with age ranges (e.g. by taking the
ranges 21–25, 25–29 and 21–29 instead of 23–27). The estimation results are barely affected
by the choice of age range (see Van der Schors et al. (2007) for more details).
8 GDP in prices of 1990.
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pied houses9. A sensitivity analysis shows that small adjustments in the
extrapolation technique do not lead to signiﬁcant changes of our results.
In order to correct for residual trending cohort effects, the vector Zc also
includes a cohort trend variable (log year of birth). This variable has no spe-
ciﬁc economic interpretation; it only corrects for possible spurious correla-
tions. Ideally, one would have liked to add more cohort speciﬁc variables such
as the stock of houses by ownership type instead of the new supply. However,
we need time series from 1930 onwards and time series for those variables are
hardly available.
The Xh,t vector consists of variables like income, marital status and a
dummy variable for being a two-earner household after 1993. The latter
reﬂects the relaxation of credit restrictions in the Netherlands. Wh is a vector
of time invariant and individual speciﬁc variables, like gender, education level
and households speciﬁc averages of Xh,t . The individual effect ωh is assumed
to be random and uncorrelated with the right-hand side variables of equation
(1). The error term εh,t is assumed to be uncorrelated with all right-hand side
variables in all time periods. In our estimation procedure, we correct the stan-
dard errors for intra-household correlation.
The model for mortgage ownership differs in one respect from that of
home ownership. Cohort effects are not explicitly modelled. Instead aggrea-
gate time effects are taken into account. Speciﬁc differences are explained in
the discussion of the estimation results for mortgage ownership. Evidently, the
two models are highly interrelated as the model explaining mortgage owner-
ship is estimated on the subsample of home owners. This selection might gen-
erate a bias in the estimation results. Ideally, we would like to correct for this
by means of a Heckman selection bias model. However, we do not dispose
of exclusion restrictions, because the decisions to buy a house and negotiate
a mortgage are taken jointly.
4 RESULTS
4.1 Home Ownership
Table 1 shows the estimation results for the home ownership model. In Model
1 all households aged 25–80 are taken into account (N =57,212). In Model 2,
on the right panel of the table, only those households are selected whose head
is older than 50 (N = 23,941). We also consider this subsample in order to
9 The information on dwellings built by the (local) government, the housing corporations and
private individuals/organisations as well as the total newly built houses is also available before
1960. The annual number of new rented houses is elicited by adding up the new houses owned
by the government, the housing corporations and 3/10 built by private parties. The remainder,
7/10 of all private houses, represents the supply of new houses in the owner-occupied sector.
After 1960, the exact number of newly built rented and owner-occupied houses is known. The
fractions of 3/10th and 7/10th are estimated on basis of data after 1960.
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investigate in more detail the claim that the housing market at young ages has
a long term effect on home ownership. The lower part of the table reports ﬁve
tests of joint signiﬁcance of the explanatory variables. The joint signiﬁcance
of the household speciﬁc averages of the time varying variables, like income,
conﬁrms our speculation that the unobserved effects are correlated with
time-varying characteristics. The fact that the selectivity dummies are jointly
signiﬁcant in Model 1 (χ2(12) = 28.35) shows that attrition does not take
place randomly. In Model 2, however, the selectivity dummies are not jointly
signiﬁcant. Therefore we re-estimated this model without including those
dummies.
The estimation results for Model 1 suggest that the probability to be home
owner increases with 6.4%-points each year in the youngest age group, while
it declines with about 0.3%-points per annum after age 65, ceteris paribus.
The estimation results for the 50+ subsample also suggest a decline in home
ownership after retirement. The effect is somewhat larger than in model 1:
from the age of 65, we ﬁnd an annual decrease in ownership of about 0.6%-
points. Whereas the direction of the age effects are approximately the same
for the two samples, the effect of the other variables dramatically differs
between Model 1 and 2.
In both models the cohort variables are jointly signiﬁcant at a 1% signiﬁ-
cance level (respectively, χ2(3) = 87.3 and χ2(3) = 52.6). This suggests that
the economic and housing market situation at the potential age of entry into
the housing market partly determines whether or not a household eventually
will become a home owner. In Model 1, a 1% increase in the supply of new
owner-occupied houses per head of the population between age 20 and 30
leads to a signiﬁcant increase in the home ownership rate of 0.09%-points.
A 1% increase in the supply of new rented houses decreases the probability
to be home owner by 0.12%-points. These opposite effects indicate that the
composition of the stock of newly built houses when the household’s head
is around age 25, affects a household’s ﬁnal position on the housing mar-
ket. In the Netherlands, the housing supply is highly regulated. Although
the housing shortage has decreased in the last few decades, there is still a
discrepancy between the demand and supply for (owner occupied) houses,
especially for some speciﬁc types and locations (Boelhouwer (2005)). Since
(semi-)public institutions have a large say in the construction of new houses
in the owner-occupied and rental sector, they have a large inﬂuence on home
ownership. Our results indicate that an increase in the new supply of houses
in the owner-occupied sector enhances starters’ opportunities to buy a house.
In this way, the excess demand for owner-occupied housing is diminished.
Contrary to our expectations, a 1% increase in the GDP level per capita
leads to a decrease in the home ownership rate10. However, this effect is not
10 We also performed a sensitivity analysis in order to check whether business cycle shocks
at young ages matter. In other words, we added the variable ‘real growth in GDP per cap-
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TABLE 1 – ESTIMATION RESULTS ON HOME OWNERSHIP FOR TWO DIFFERENT
AGE GROUPS
Model 1 Model 2
Parameter St. err. Parameter St. err.
estimates estimates
Cohort variables
1: Supply of newly owner-occupied
houses per capita 0.09*** 0.015 0.017 0.016
2: Supply of newly built rented
houses per capita −0.12*** 0.013 −0.00 0.016
3: Absolute level of GDP per capita −0.07 0.055 0.17*** 0.033
Log (income) 0.009*** 0.002 0.0009 0.002
Log(income) 0.096*** 0.007 0.1163*** 0.013
Two-earner household (yes = 1) 0.001 0.008 −0.0001 0.012
Year after 1993 (yes = 1) −0.01 0.0 −0.008 0.004
Two-earner after 1993 0.030*** 0.009 0.0069 0.012
(intro two-earner rule)
Intermediate education 0.046*** 0.012 0.008 0.022
Higher vocational and university 0.080*** 0.013 0.08*** 0.021
education
Family size 0.021*** 0.004 0.013* 0.008
Marital status
(ref.group= single, never married)
Married (yes = 1) 0.111*** 0.019 0.0243 0.023
Divorced (yes = 1) 0.03 0.026 −0.06* 0.034
Widow (yes = 1) 0.101*** 0.027 0.0042 0.019
Sex (male = 1) 0.089*** 0.014 0.0611** 0.025
Age splines
25–30 0.064*** 0.004
30–40 0.022*** 0.001
40–45 0.008*** 0.002
45–50 0.01*** 0.002
50–55 0.0068*** 0.002 0.0048** 0.002
55–60 0.006** 0.002 0.0040 0.002
60–65 0.002 0.002 −0.0002 0.002
65–70 −0.002* 0.002 −0.004*** 0.001
70–75 −0.003** 0.002 −0.005*** 0.002
75–80 −0.003 0.002 −0.006*** 0.002
Cohort trend variable 0.43*** 0.072
Constant term −2.9788 0.469 −2.328*** 0.34
N 5,7212 2,3941
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TABLE 1 – continued
Model 1 Model 2
Parameter St. err. Parameter St. err.
estimates estimates
Joint signiﬁcance (chi square test):
Household speciﬁc averages χ27 = 303*** χ
2
7 =99***
Age splines χ210 =525*** χ26 =32***
Income variables χ22 =211*** χ22 =77***
Cohort variables χ23 =85*** χ23 =53***
Selectivity dummies χ212 =28*** not included
Explanatory note: Model 1: all ages between 25 and 80. Model 2: 50+ respon-
dents. Signiﬁcance levels ***= 1%; **= 5%; *= 10%. We do not present the esti-
mated coefﬁcients of the household speciﬁc averages, except from the time average
of log(income). The cohort trend variable is a log trend based on year of birth. We
dropped the cohort trend variable from Model 2 because of non-signiﬁcance.
The selectivity dummies are jointly signiﬁcant in the total sample, but not in the
50+ model. Therefore, they are included in Model 1 and dropped in Model 2.
Source: SEP, own computations
statistically signiﬁcant. A possible explanation for this result is the fact the
cohort trend variable is highly signiﬁcant. The cohort trend variable appears
to be highly correlated with GDP per capita (correlation coefﬁcient = 0.971).
The high signiﬁcance of the cohort trend variable signals the presence of
unobserved, trending cohort effects. One of such trending cohort effects could
be the house prices (relative to the rents) at the moment of entering the hous-
ing market.
Total household income appears to have a signiﬁcant positive effect on
home ownership. Notably, we can make a distinction between the effect
of permanent and transitory income: the household speciﬁc average of
log(income), (log(income)), serves as a proxy variable for permanent income.
However, we should be careful with interpreting the variable. For the elderly
subsample the permanent income consists of 13 years of income after retire-
ment. This underestimates a household’s real permanent income. In Model
1, a 1% increase in permanent income leads to a rise in the home owner-
ita’ around age 25 as an extra regressor in the model (next to GDP in levels). In both the
full and the 50+ sample this extra variable was not statistically signiﬁcant (see Van der Schors
et al. (2007)).
NOTES AND COMMUNICATIONS 111
ship rate of 0.11%-points11. The transitory income component has a small,
but signiﬁcant effect on home ownership. In Model 2 only the variable
measuring the household’s speciﬁc average of log(income), (log(income)),
contributes positively to the probability to be home owner (0.12%-points).
On basis of the Model 1 results we ﬁnd that for two-earner households after
1993, the probability to be home owner signiﬁcantly increases, ceteris pari-
bus, by 3%-points. The three variables that measure the effect of being a two-
earner household after 1993 are jointly signiﬁcant at a 1% signiﬁcance level
(χ2(3)= 33.87). It suggests that the relaxation of credit constraints for two-
earner households increases the chance of two-earner households to buy a
house (at the cost of one-earner households). However, the three indicators
are not jointly statistically signiﬁcant if we consider the 50+ sample. Also
the individual dummy variable that indicates whether or not a household is
a two-earner household after 1993 is insigniﬁcant for this subsample. Appar-
ently, many of the elderly two-earner households do no longer plan to become
home owner despite the existence two-earner rule.
If we only take the elderly households into account (cf. Model 2), the
effect and signiﬁcance of the cohort variables strongly deviate from those in
Model 1. Model 2 does not contain a cohort trend, since the coefﬁcient esti-
mate of this variable did not differ signiﬁcantly from zero. In Model 2 the
two housing supply variables around age 25 are no longer signiﬁcant. This
suggests that the housing market conditions when entering the housing mar-
ket have no effect on home ownership for the elderly sample. On the other
hand, the GDP per capita around age 25 is highly signiﬁcant. A 1% incre-
ment in the GDP per capita increases home ownership by 0.18%-points12.
Possibly, the initial macro economic situation affects the income situation of a
household in later periods and hence the opportunities to buy a house. This is
quite plausible, despite the fact that we have already included proxy variables
for transitory and permanent income. Those proxy variables might be imper-
fect, since the permanent income proxy only takes the income of 13 years
into account. For most elderly households (i.e. the households considered in
Model 2) this means that the permanent income is an average of mainly pen-
sion income, which is expected to be lower than the income during working
life. The GDP cohort variable, on the contrary, reﬂects the effect of being
born (and raised) in a speciﬁc period with speciﬁc economic conditions, for
example in the period before World War II or just after 1945.
11 The effect of the permanent income on home ownership is equal to the coefﬁcient of
income variable itself (transitory component) plus the coefﬁcient of the variable related to the
household speciﬁc average of income.
12 We examined the effect of including the GDP growth as an additional cohort variable,
to account for the effect of changes in the economic situation. Because this potential cohort
variable was not signiﬁcant in any of the estimations (see Van der Schors et al. (2007)), we
decided not to include this variable.
112 DE ECONOMIST 155, NO. 1, 2007
-1 0
-5
0
5
10
15
20
19
26
19
28
19
30
19
32
19
34
19
36
19
38
19
40
19
42
19
44
19
46
19
48
19
50
19
52
19
54
19
56
19
58
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
year of birth
n
o
rm
al
iz
ed
 e
ffe
ct
 o
f c
oh
or
t v
ar
ia
bl
es
 o
n 
ho
m
e 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p
Figure 4 – The joint effect of the cohort variables on home ownership (all ages).
Explanatory note: the ﬁgure is based on the estimation results from Model 1
(whole sample). The vertical axis is normalised to zero in year 1926.
Source: own computations
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Figure 5 – The joint effect of the cohort variables on home ownership (households above age 50).
Explanatory note: the ﬁgure is based on the estimation results from Model 2 (ages between 50
and 80). The vertical axis is normalised to zero in year 1910.
Source: own computations
Figure 4 shows the joint effect of the cohort variables by year of birth
on basis of the results of Model 113. The cohort effect is normalised to zero
for the ﬁrst year of birth in the graph (1926). Between birth years 1926 and
1960 we do not observe a clear pattern. From 1960 onwards, we see strong
13 The joint effect is computed by multiplying for each year of birth the coefﬁcient of each
of the cohort variables by the value of the cohort variables. Afterwards, we take the sum of
the three multiplications for each year of birth. In computing the joint effect, we do not take
the cohort trend variable into account.
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positive cohort effects: comparing the 1966 and 1978 generations, there is a
difference of 10%-points in the home ownership rate. On the base of Figure
4 it seems that the cohort variables only explain differences in home owner-
ship between younger generations of households, consistent with our specu-
lations above. Figure 5 shows the effect of the cohort variables when we use
the coefﬁcients estimated in Model 2. Notice that in Figure 5 the cohort effect
is mainly driven by the GDP variable. Contrary to Figures 4 and 5 suggests
positive cohort effects among the elderly cohorts: the probability to be home
owner is 15%-points higher for households with a head born in 1950, com-
pared to those born in 1930.
Altogether, the fact that the estimation results of Models 1 and 2 differ
dramatically suggests that in Model 1 interactions between cohort variables
and age should be taken into account. Consequently, we think that the results
based on the 50+ subsample describe more adequately the cohort effects of
the elderly households. To check whether the three cohort speciﬁc variables
satisfactorily describe the cohort effects, we include a full set cohort dummies
to the model (results not displayed)14. If the coefﬁcients corresponding to the
cohort dummies are jointly insigniﬁcant, the included cohort variables explain
most of the cohort effects. It appears that the cohort dummies are not jointly
signiﬁcant at a 1% signiﬁcance level (χ2(37)=30.24). So, for the 50+ subsam-
ple, it seems that the GDP per capita and the two housing supply variables at
the potential age of entry on the housing market describe most cohort effects.
4.2 Mortgage Ownership
Table 2 summarises the estimation results of the model explaining mortgage
ownership. In this analysis, we only select home owners older than 50 because
we do not expect respondents to be able to redeem their mortgage at youn-
ger ages (see Figure 2 in section 2). This reduces the sample to 11,533 obser-
vations, which refer to 2,223 households. The models explaining mortgage
ownership and home ownership differ in several respects. First, we do not
explicitly model generation effects, because we could not ﬁnd appropriate
cohort speciﬁc variables and the relevant data. Instead, we use a linear spline
function of year of birth which contains six knots. The second difference is
that we account for time effects in explaining mortgage ownership. By includ-
ing time dummies to measure the time effect, we would run into the well-
known identiﬁcation problem: because of the identity calender year = age +
year of birth, one cannot disentangle age, cohort and time effects. We solve
this identiﬁcation problem by explicitly modelling the time effect by means of
14 To avoid perfect collinearity problems (we included three cohort speciﬁc variables), we
need to drop arbitrarily three cohort dummies.
114 DE ECONOMIST 155, NO. 1, 2007
TABLE 2 – MORTGAGE OWNERSHIP AMONG HOME OWNERS BETWEEN AGE 50
AND 80
Coefﬁcient St.error
Inﬂation rate (as a %) 0.007*** 0.002
Log(average house price) 0.136*** 0.043
Years of living in the current home −0.001 0.001
Relative value of the house 0.008* 0.005
Log (total income) −0.003 0.005
Log(income) 0.037*** 0.012
Intermediate education 0.030 0.021
Higher vocational and university education 0.061** 0.024
Family size −0.004 0.009
Marital status (ref.group= single, never married)
Married (yes = 1) −0.110 0.090
Divorced (yes = 1) −0.088 0.110
Widow (yes = 1) −0.071 0.097
Sex (male = 1) −0.001 0.036
Age splines
50–55 −0.015*** 0.004
55–60 −0.013*** 0.005
60–65 −0.025*** 0.005
65–70 −0.015*** 0.006
70–75 −0.005 0.007
75–80 −0.016*** 0.006
Birth cohorts splines
before 1927 −0.001 0.006
1927–1931 0.021** 0.011
1932–1936 −0.003 0.010
1937–1941 0.015** 0.008
1942–1946 −0.005 0.006
1947–1952 −0.021*** 0.007
Constant −1.202*** 0.398
N 11,533
Joint signiﬁcance of (chi square test) :
Household speciﬁc averages χ2(7)=31.32
Age splines χ2(6)=34.67
Cohort splines χ2(6)=36.18
Income variables χ2(2)=10.38
Explanatory note: The model includes all ages between 50 and 80. ***= signiﬁcant
at 1% conﬁdence level; **= signiﬁcant at 5% conﬁdence level; * = signiﬁcant at 10%
conﬁdence level. The use of the real interest rate instead of the inﬂation rate as a
time speciﬁc variable does hardly affect the results. The real interest rate itself has a
signiﬁcant negative effect on mortgage ownership (see Van der Schors et al. (2007)).
Source: SEP, own computations
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the inﬂation rate and the real average house price during the sample period15.
Finally, the model explaining mortgage ownership includes two extra house-
hold speciﬁc variables. One regressor reports the value of one’s house relative
to the average house price at the housing market16. The other one indicates
the length of residence in the current home. In our econometric model we
do not take into account that the possibility to deduct mortgage interest pay-
ments from taxable income has been curtailed somewhat from the year 2001
onwards17. This reform could only have an effect in the last year of the
sample period. We expect that households do not directly respond to such
reforms and hence the effect is expected to be limited.
As we expected, the age spline coefﬁcient estimates are negative and differ
signiﬁcantly from zero (χ2(6)=34.7). So, each year the head of the household
becomes older, the probability of having a mortgage decreases. However, it is
rather surprising that the size of the age effects ﬂuctuates instead of becom-
ing more strongly negative when older. This result is in accordance with the
age proﬁle we saw in Figure 3.
The cohort splines are jointly signiﬁcant (χ2(6)=36.2). The empirical evi-
dence suggests that mortgage ownership is a non-decreasing function of the
year of birth up to 1946. If the head of the household was born in 1937 the
probability to be mortgage owner is 6%-points larger, relative to the house-
holds in which the head was born in 1927. These results partly explain the
cohort-time effects observed in Figures 2 and 3. The size of the positive
cohort effect differs among generations.
Both the inﬂation rate and the logarithm of the house prices have a sig-
niﬁcant positive effect on mortgage ownership. These are the indicators that
correct for time effects and should therefore pick up the business cycle. If one
expects higher inﬂation in the near future it becomes ﬁnancially attractive to
take up a mortgage. Of course we do not know whether current inﬂation can
signal for future inﬂation expectations, though many studies have found evi-
dence of this (Engelberg et al. (2006)). The effect of inﬂation indeed appears
to be positive and signiﬁcant. A 1% increase in the house prices results in
an increase in the mortgage ownership rate by 0.14%-points. Possibly, this
might imply that an increase in house prices induces households to cash the
surplus value on their house by negotiating a mortgage again18. Similar to
15 We have obtained data on the average house prices from the Dutch foundation of real estate
agents (Nederlandse Vereniging voor Makelaars). The prices are corrected for inﬂation each year.
16 These values are expressed in prices of 1990.
17 As of 2001, the tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments is restricted to a maxi-
mum duration of 30 years. Moreover, the interest can only be deducted if the mortgage is used
for the ﬁnance of the house or home improvements and no longer for consumption purposes.
18 If we use the real interest rate instead of the inﬂation rate as a time speciﬁc variable,
the estimation results remain rather constant. It does hardly affect the age and cohort effects.
The real interest rate itself has a signiﬁcant negative effect on mortgage ownership (see Van
der Schors et al. (2007)).
116 DE ECONOMIST 155, NO. 1, 2007
the misspeciﬁcation test on the cohort speciﬁc variables, we test whether the
two time variables satisfactorily describe the time effect. Therefore, we include
all time dummies to the model (results not displayed)19. The null hypothe-
sis, which states that the coefﬁcients corresponding to the time dummies are
jointly equal to zero, cannot be rejected at a 1% signiﬁcance level (χ2(9) =
11.50). This suggests that we effectively capture most time effects by means
of the inﬂation rate and house prices.
Besides the age, time and cohort effects, it seems that the average log (total
income), our proxy for the permanent income, signiﬁcantly contributes to
the explanation of mortgage ownership. The effect is however small: a 1%
increase enhances the probability to have a mortgage with 0.034%-points.
Transitory income has no signiﬁcant effect. Furthermore, the results show
that the number of years living in the current home does not signiﬁcantly
affect the probability to have a mortgage. Finally, it appears that the proba-
bility to be mortgage owner is an increasing function of the ratio of the house
value and the average house price in the Netherlands.
5 COHORT EFFECTS IN MORTGAGE OWNERSHIP: A FURTHER ANALYSIS
In the home ownership models, we are able to explain the cohort effects.
However, this is not true for the model that considers mortgage owner-
ship. Ideally, we would have liked to include generation speciﬁc variables
to describe those cohort effects. However, relevant aggregate data are barely
available. A second problem is that the SEP does not contain much infor-
mation on the mortgage contract. For instance we do not know when the
mortgages are taken up. Therefore, we resort to a more descriptive analysis
to explain the cohort effects in mortgage ownership observed in the previous
section. For this purpose, we use information from the DHS data to discuss
some of the issues that have arisen, or that we could not account for, in the
previous section. Contrary to the SEP, this DHS questionnaire includes ques-
tions about the residual duration of a mortgage, bequest and savings motives
and the popularity of several mortgage types.
Figure 6 shows that for each age above 50, the number of years elapsed
since the arrangement of the mortgage is smaller in 2005 than in 1993: the
difference is about 3 years. Although it cannot fully explain the cohort effect
in mortgage ownership, the shift in the age of mortgage take up could be one
of the candidate explanations. This shift in the age of mortgage take-up might
be explained by the fact that younger generation households move more fre-
quently than the old ones. An alternative explanation might be that in com-
parison with the older generation younger cohorts have a higher tendency
to ‘re-mortgage’ their house after the completion of the initial mortgage
19 To avoid linear combinations, we need to drop four time dummies; year 1990–1993.
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Figure 6 – Time from mortgage arrangement in 1993 and 2005 (in years).
Explanatory note: lowess smoothing has been used to determine the
relation between age and remaining mortgage duration.
Source: DHS, own computations
contract. From other data sources, we get the impression that the last expla-
nation is more plausible. Statistics Netherlands (1999) for instance reports
that in the third quarter of 1999 about 60% of the new mortgages were used
to exploit the increase in the house value to buy other durable goods and to
ﬁnance stock market operations.
Although, we cannot prove this directly, our speculation is strengthened by
the fact that the increase in ﬁrst mortgages is accompanied by a considerable
rise in the number of home owners with a second mortgage20. It increases
from almost zero to about 10% for the retired elderly (see Figure 7) between
1993 and 2005. Second mortgages are mostly used to cash the surplus value
for other purposes. In the last waves of the DHS-survey, in 2003 to 2005,
home owners who cashed the surplus value were asked for what purpose they
used the mortgage loan. The majority of the respondents reports that they
have employed this for home improvements (55%). Home improvements can
be regarded as a way to increase the market value of the house and also allow
the home owner to enjoy an extra tax facility. Merely 18% of the respon-
dents used it for the purchase of durable goods. In other words, the use of
housing wealth to ﬁnance consumption does not seem to be very popular yet.
It should be mentioned, however, that from 2001 onwards mortgage interest
payments are no longer tax deductible if the mortgage is used to ﬁnance dura-
20 One speaks of a second mortgage if a household indicates that it has two mortgage con-
tracts outstanding on the same dwelling.
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Figure 7 – The fraction of mortgage owners with a second mortgage in 1993 and 2005.
Explanatory note: lowess smoothing has been used to determine the relation between
age and second mortgage ownership.
Source: DHS, own computations
ble expenditures (except for the purpose of home improvement) or stock mar-
ket operations.
Another explanation for the generational differences in mortgage own-
ership could be related to changes in elderly’s attitude towards leaving a
bequest. More often, parents realise that their children are well educated and
hence will be ﬁnancially well off. Therefore, younger generation parents could
ﬁnd it less important to bequeath their house to their children (Hurd (1990)).
Instead, they can use the housing wealth to ﬁnance consumption after retire-
ment. The DHS-survey includes the following interesting question:
Please indicate which of the following four statements about parents leaving a
bequest to their children, would be closest to your own opinion about this.
1. If our children would take good care of us when we get old, we would like
to leave them a considerable bequest.
2. We would like to leave our children a considerable bequest, irrespective of
the way they will take care of us when we are old.
3. We have no preconceived plans about leaving a bequest to our children
because we want to enjoy our own lives.
4. We don’t intend to leave a bequest to our children, because we don’t want
to do that.
5. NONE of the above-mentioned statements.
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It should be noted that more than 60% of the respondents selects the third
option indicating that many respondents do not ﬁnd it important to leave a
bequest. Their bequests would mostly be accidental. We compare the answers
to this question in 1993 with 2003 by looking at elderly (55+) home owners.
It appears that between 1993 and 2003, the fraction of home owners with an
accidental bequest motive increased signiﬁcantly (from 57 to 64%). This result
suggests that leaving a bequest has become a slightly less important saving
motive.
Finally, ﬁnancial innovation could have contributed to the increase in the
mortgage ownership rate. We see that the increase is accompanied by an
increase in the popularity of the interest-only mortgage. Whereas in 1993 30%
of all elderly mortgage owners between 60 and 70 years old had an inter-
est-only mortgage, this share has risen to 50% in 2005. This large increase
is mirrored in the reduction of the annuity mortgage. It is unclear how the
increase in the interest-only mortgage relates to the increase in mortgage own-
ership in general; the causality could be in both directions. In future research
it would be interesting to analyse the elderly’s choice for this speciﬁc mort-
gage type.
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this study, we have investigated home and mortgage ownership of the
Dutch elderly. In the descriptive analysis, we establish that among the elderly
there are considerable generational differences in the home ownership rate.
We have developed an econometric model which, among other things, can
be used to explain those cohort effects. Even after correction for important
background characteristics, such as income and education level, cohort effects
remain important. The main factor explaining the generational differences
in home ownership is by the level of GDP per capita when the household
head was about 25 years old. This cohort speciﬁc variable has been included
in order to account for generational differences in permanent income. How-
ever, if we take the whole sample into account it appears that the supply
of new owner-occupied and rented houses per capita between the age of 20
and 30 affects home ownership. Interestingly, the situation at the housing
market does no longer explain generational differences when looking at the
households above age 50 in particular. These highly deviating results sug-
gest that interaction effects between cohort and age effects play an impor-
tant role. In future research the existence of such interactions should be
explored in more detail using a larger dataset such as the Income Panel Sur-
vey (IPO—this is an administrative dataset collected by Statistics Nether-
lands).
Our results suggest that during retirement home ownership decreases with
age. It might be worthwhile to investigate this further using a transition
120 DE ECONOMIST 155, NO. 1, 2007
model (Tatsiramos (2004)). Again, data from IPO might prove useful here,
since transitions out of home ownership to nursing homes are relevant when
observing elderly. Such a study is not possible with SEP because house-
holds in institutions, like nursery homes, are excluded from the sample
frame.
The fraction of elderly home owners that has a mortgage debt has also
increased considerably during the nineties. Around age 60 the mortgage
ownership is much higher for home owners born around 1935 relative to
those born around 1930. This difference amounts to 20%-points. Instead of
modelling the cohort effects, we explain the time effects by including two time
speciﬁc variables, namely house prices and the inﬂation rate. It appears that
these variables capture most of the time effects. The cohort splines in the
econometric model are jointly signiﬁcant, indicating that cohort effects should
be taken into account when explaining mortgage ownership. A supplementary
analysis has been performed in order to gain a better understanding of the
causes underlying this residual cohort and time effects. It appears that among
the retirees the accidental motive to leave a bequest has become more impor-
tant during the nineties. Moreover, ﬁnancial innovation, residual mortgage
duration and the take up of second mortgages all contribute to the expla-
nation of the increase in mortgage ownership of the elderly, though their
effect is not always unambiguous. The supplementary analysis presented in
the paper is rather descriptive. A more thorough multivariate analysis seems
to be necessary. Nevertheless, our analysis shows that both time and cohort
effects contribute to the explanation of the strongly increased mortgage own-
ership among elderly home owners.
Anna van der Schors∗
Rob J.M. Alessie∗∗
Mauro Mastrogiacomo∗∗∗
REFERENCES
Alessie, R., A. Lusardi and A. Kapteyn (1995), ‘Saving and Wealth Holding of the Elderly,’
Ricerche Economiche, 49, pp. 293–315.
Alessie, R., A. Kapteyn and F. Klijn (1997), ‘Mandatory Pensions and Personal Savings in
the Netherlands,’ Economist, 3(145), pp. 291–324.
∗ Corresponding author: Utrecht School of Economics (USE), Utrecht University, Janskerkhof
12, 3512 BL, Utrecht, The Netherlands, Phone: 030-2534283, fax 030-2537373, e-mail: A.van-
derSchors@econ.uu.nl
∗∗Utrecht School of Economics (USE), Utrecht University, Janskerkhof 12, 3512 BL, Utrecht,
The Netherlands, and CPB (Netherlands bureau for Economic Policy Analysis), Van Stolkweg
14, P.O. Box 80510, 2508 GM, The Hague, The Netherlands
∗∗∗CPB (Netherlands bureau for Economic Policy Analysis) Van Stolkweg 14, P.O. Box 80510,
2508 GM, The Hague, The Netherlands, and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan
1105, 1081 HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, e-mail: m.mastrogiacomo@cpb.nl
NOTES AND COMMUNICATIONS 121
Alessie, R. and A. Kapteyn (2002), ‘Huizenprijzen en Besparingen,’ in: R. Alessie, P. van Els
and L. Hoogduin (eds.), De Rol Van Vermogen in de Economie, BNG, Preadviezen voor
de Koninklijke Vereniging van de Staathuishoudkunde, Den Haag, pp. 31–56.
Boelhouwer, P.J. (2005), ‘The Incomplete Privatization of the Dutch Housing Market: Explod-
ing House Prices versus Falling House-Building Output,’ Journal of Housing and the Built
Environment, 20, pp. 363–378.
Chiuri, M. and T. Jappelli (2000), ‘Financial Market Imperfections and Home Ownership: A
Comparative Study,’ Fisciano, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance.
Chiuri, M. and T. Jappelli (2006), ‘Do the Elderly Reduce Housing Equity; an International
Comparison,’ Fisciano, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance.
Deaton, A. (1992), Understanding Consumption. Oxford New York, Oxford University Press.
Disney, R., A. Henley and G. Stears (2002), ‘Housing Costs, House Price Shocks and Savings
Behaviour among Older Households in Britain,’ Regional Science and Urban Economics,
32, pp. 607–625.
Engelberg, J., C. Manski and J. Williams (2006), ‘Comparing the Point Predictions and
Subjective Probability Distributions of Professional Forecasters,’ NBER Working Papers,
(11978).
Groeneveld, J.M. and R.T.A. de Haas (1999), ‘De Schuld van de Huishoudens,’ Economisch
Statistische Berichten, 84.
Haffner, M.E.A. (2005), ‘Appel voor de Dorst?; Vermogen van Ouderen op de Woningmarkt,’
Nethur.
Hurd, M.D. (1989), ‘Mortality Risk and Bequests,’ Econometrica, 57(2), pp. 779–813.
Hurd, M.D. (1990), ‘Research on the Elderly: Economic Status, Retirement and Consumption
and Saving II,’ Journal of Economic Literature, XXVIII, pp. 565–637.
Kapteyn, A., R. Alessie and A. Lusardi (2005), ‘Explaining the Wealth Holdings of Different
Cohorts: Productivity Growth and Social Security,’ The European Economic Review, 49, pp.
1361–1391.
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (1999), Evaluatie Nota Volkshuisvest-
ing in de Jaren Negentig, Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment, The
Hague.
Mundlak, Y. (1978), ‘On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data,’ Econometrica,
XXVII(46), pp. 69–85.
Nyhus, E. (1996), ‘The VSB-CentER Savings Project: Data Collection Methods, Question-
naires and Sampling Procedures,’ VSB-CentER Savings Project Progress Report no. 42, Til-
burg University.
Rouwendal, J. and R. Alessie (2002), ‘House Prices, Second Mortgages and Household Sav-
ings; an Empirical Investigation for the Netherlands, 1987–1994,’ Tinbergen Institute Dis-
cussion Papers, TI 2002-074/3.
Statistics Netherlands (1999), ‘Hypotheekmarkt Overtreft Alle Records,’ Press Release PB99-
285.
Tatsiramos, K. (2004), ‘Residential Mobility and the Housing Adjustment of the Elderly: Evi-
dence for the ECHP for Six European Countries,’ European University Institute/IZA.
Van Assenbergh, W. (1998), ‘De Ene Hypotheek is de Andere Niet,’ Economisch Statistische
Berichten, (83), 36–38.
Van der Schors, A., R. Alessie and M. Mastrogiacomo (2007), ‘Home and Mortgage Own-
ership of the Dutch Elderly: Explaining Cohort, Time and Age Effects’, CPB discussion
paper, 77.
